The Department of Energy’s Part 810 regulations, governing the export of peaceful nuclear energy technology, are long overdue for modernization. The rule lacks transparency, predictability and efficiency, and impedes our manufacturing and technology sectors from increasing exports and jobs. The rule is overly complicated and, in trying to protect too much, diminishes the ability of the United States to focus efforts on the most critical national security priorities.
In September 2011, the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration proposed changes to the Part 810 regulations. The proposed rule fails to remedy the existing problems with Part 810, and it exacerbates those problems in several fundamental ways.
A Comparative Analysis of National Regimes for the Control of Nuclear Materials, Components and Technology
A study on nuclear export controls was prepared for the Nuclear Energy Institute by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, and published on October 1, 2012. The study found that the commercial nuclear export control regimes of the five leading nuclear supplier countries – the United States, the Russian Federation, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and France – revealed that the U.S. regime is more complex, restrictive and time-consuming than other regimes examined in the study. Taken together, the differences between the U.S. and non-U.S. regimes result in a competitive disadvantage on commercial nuclear exp orters from the United States.
The report focuses on key aspects of nuclear export control, such as the structure and organization of regulatory systems, the scope of controls over nuclear and nuclear-related commodities and technology, types of licenses issued, license issuance requirements, processing times, and other distinguishing characteristics of each regime.