Public Policy

My name is Joe Colvin. I am the President and Chief Executive Officer for the Nuclear Energy Institute. NEI sets policy for the U.S. nuclear energy industry, including 275 member organizations with a broad spectrum of interests, including every U.S. utility that operates a nuclear power plant. NEI also counts among its members nuclear fuel cycle companies, suppliers, engineering and consulting firms, national research laboratories, manufacturers of radiopharmaceuticals, universities, labor unions and law firms.

On behalf of the Nuclear Energy Institute, I would like to commend you, Chairman Barton, Ranking Member Boucher and the members of this subcommittee for focusing your attention on the Department of Energy's responsibility to manage our nation's used nuclear fuel and the nuclear byproducts of defense activities and evaluation of the suitability of locating a geologic disposal facility at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. America's program to manage high-level radioactive waste has tremendous implications on our energy policy as well as policy for environmental protection, national security, and economic development.

Nuclear energy generates 20 percent of the nation's electricity—enough energy to supply 65 million homes. Our nation's 103 nuclear power reactors have proven to be efficient, reliable and economical. They provide stability to the nation's power grid and produce about 70 percent of our emission-free electricity. The United States has the largest commercial nuclear power program in the world, with over 100,000-megawatts of generating capacity. U.S. companies are the global leaders in the development of nuclear power technology, including advanced reactor designs being built in Asian markets.

The nuclear energy industry has consistently improved the operation and efficiency of the nation's nuclear power plants. In it's more than 2,400 reactor-years of operation, the industry has compiled a safety record that is unparalleled. In 1999, nuclear power plants produced a record 728 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity, 53 billion kilowatt-hours more than the previous year. During the 1990s, the increase in electricity output from U.S. nuclear power plants was equivalent to adding nineteen 1,000-megawatt power plants to our nation's electricity grid. Last year's record performance capped the best decade in the industry's history, including a dramatic increase in nuclear plant average capacity factor—from 67.5 percent in 1990 to 86.8 percent in 1999. The result has been a growing number of policymakers, financial analysts and consumers who are rediscovering the benefits of nuclear energy.

The world population is likely to reach 10 billion people by the middle of this century. Three separate studies—by the World Energy Council, the International Energy Agency and the Department of Energy—predict that world energy demand may increase as much as 44 percent in the next decade, and by up to 98 percent by 2020. These same projections show that most of the increased electricity demand is likely to be met by power plants burning fossil fuels. The World Energy Council recently recommended expanding nuclear energy around the world because it is a clean source of energy.

Domestically, the digital age, with its rapid growth in the use of technology, will consume more and more electricity. Our ability to remain leaders in this age of information depends upon our ability to meet increasing energy demands.

Population growth and economic expansion have created a major dilemma for world leaders. We must simultaneously address both the burgeoning demand for electricity and a growing awareness of the need to provide energy in ways that will protect our air quality. Nuclear energy is the most effective method of protecting our air quality while producing massive quantities of electricity at a competitive price.

Nuclear energy's environmental and economic benefits cannot be fully realized unless Congress actively supports federal programs that will resolve the few remaining public policy challenges confronting the nuclear energy industry. One important outstanding issue—and unfortunately also a most intransigent one—is development of a federal disposal system for used nuclear fuel.

For the members of this subcommittee who may not be familiar with the operation of a commercial nuclear facility, used fuel from these plants consists of solid ceramic uranium pellets encased in zirconium alloy tubes called fuel rods. A typical nuclear power plant produces about 20 metric tons of solid used fuel each year. All of the used fuel produced by the nuclear energy industry in more than 30 years of operation—if stacked end to end—-would cover an area the size of a football field to a depth of about four yards. This is not a physically huge problem. There is approximately 40,000 tons of used nuclear fuel being safely stored in temporary on-site facilities, but these facilities were not designed for permanent disposal.

Unlike many public policy matters, used nuclear fuel management is an issue on which there is a broad consensus. As has been the case since the 1950s, scientists today understand that deep geologic disposal of used nuclear fuel in an underground repository is the safest means of permanent disposal. Federal policymakers, scientists, state regulators, state legislators, governors, the nuclear energy industry, labor unions, business and the American people—all agree on the nature of the Energy Department's responsibility and on what must be done to ensure the successful development of a repository as soon as possible. That action must be taken now.

This year, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000 by large bipartisan majorities. Although the industry is disappointed that President Clinton vetoed the legislation, we will continue to pursue public policy changes that will ensure that the Department of Energy fulfills its responsibility to manage used nuclear fuel safely and without further delay.

Congress Must Provide Accountability to Meet Yucca Mountain Milestones
This subcommittee is well aware of the history of the used fuel management program. Used nuclear fuel has been safely stored at nuclear power plant sites for decades with no impact on public health or the environment. However, the Department of Energy's program to manage used nuclear fuel is a chronicle of missed milestones and broken promises. The federal government has been responsible for permanent disposal of used nuclear fuel since Congress established the commercial use of nuclear energy in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In 1982, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which assigned responsibility for management of used nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants to the Department of Energy. Congress was told by DOE that permanent disposal facilities would be ready in 1998, and that date was written into the law. Electric companies were required to sign contracts with DOE for management of fuel in order to continue to operate their nuclear power plants.

The legislation also created the Nuclear Waste Fund to fully cover the costs of disposing of commercial used nuclear fuel. Since then, consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants have paid a surcharge of one-tenth of a cent per kilowatt-hour of electricity into this fund. To date, utility customers have committed more than $14.7 billion (including earned interest) for federal used fuel management. The federal government also has an obligation to pay its share of the cost of the repository. Radioactive byproducts from U.S. defense applications will account for approximately 10 percent of the material by weight and 30 percent by volume to be disposed at Yucca Mountain. Through 1999, $1.2 billion in defense funding had been appropriated for the Yucca Mountain project, but the defense commitment to the fund remains $1.5 billion in arrears. Significant increases in annual defense appropriations for Yucca Mountain in the near term will be needed to make up this shortfall.

Despite recent progress at Yucca Mountain, the Energy Department's program for developing a repository historically has been beset by chronic delays. And, despite a majority of Congress that supports legislation to reform this program and allow acceptance of used fuel at Yucca Mountain as early as 2007 if the site is licensed, the White House consistently has blocked these sensible efforts. The Department of Energy now says that a repository will be ready in 2010 at the earliest—12 years later than the law requires.

According to DOE's draft environmental impact statement for a Yucca Mountain repository, leaving used fuel at reactor sites is more expensive and less environmentally responsible than building the repository. Electricity consumers are being forced to pay twice to manage used nuclear fuel—once for expanding storage facilities at plant sites and again for the federal repository program. Moreover, the federal government could face a multi-billion-dollar liability for defaulting on its legal obligation to begin managing nuclear fuel in 1998. DOE delay could also result in used fuel and nuclear waste from America's defense programs continuing to be stored in 40 states rather than at a single, federal repository, where it would be more efficiently managed.

The completion of a federal disposal facility is one of the nation's top environmental priorities. Congress must ensure that the Energy Department meets the current schedule milestone for a July 2001 recommendation to the President on whether Yucca Mountain is suitable for a repository. Moreover, Congress should appropriate the necessary funding from the Nuclear Waste Fund to ensure that a repository is built and licensed to meet the scheduled milestones.

Scientific Studies Indicate Yucca Mountain Is Suitable Repository Site
The Energy Department has spent approximately $6.5 billion from the Nuclear Waste Fund to conduct world-class scientific research at Yucca Mountain. The result of this monumental research project is an impressive database that indicates that the site can be safely developed and operated for thousands of years. In a letter to President Clinton in December 1998, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said: "Based on the results of the viability assessment, the Department (of Energy) believes that scientific and technical work at Yucca Mountain should proceed." Richardson added that the viability assessment-a "road map" for work necessary to support a 2001 decision on whether to recommend that the President approve a repository at Yucca Mountain-"reveals no showstoppers."

The assessment noted: "Over 15 years of extensive research has validated many of the expectations of the scientists who first suggested the remote, desert regions of the Southwest were well suited for a geologic repository." The DOE analysis states that engineered barriers can be designed to contain used fuel for thousands of years, and that natural barriers, such as the geological makeup of Yucca Mountain, can delay movement and dilute radioactive material.

In 1999, DOE released the findings of a draft environmental impact statement on Yucca Mountain. As with the viability assessment, the results provided strong support for Yucca Mountain as the site for a federal repository. The Energy Department did not find any environmental factors that would disqualify Yucca Mountain as a site for a permanent repository or prevent the engineered facility from safely containing high-level radioactive waste for thousands of years. DOE's draft environmental impact statement concluded that the environmental impacts associated with building and operating a repository would be small—so small that it would have virtually no adverse impact on public health and safety. Radiation exposure thousands of years into the future is projected to be no more than one percent of natural sources.

Interim Steps Crucial To Keeping DOE Site Recommendation on Schedule
There are specific interim steps necessary to ensure that DOE remains on schedule to make a formal site suitability recommendation to the President in 2001. DOE repeatedly has stated that it will meet these program deadlines. For example, on June 23rd, Dr. Ivan Itkin, Director of DOE's civilian waste management program, told Congress that it should hold the agency accountable for maintaining the DOE timetable for building a repository at Yucca Mountain.

Among DOE's interim milestones are the following:

• Siting Criteria: By this fall, DOE is to specify the criteria it plans to use to make a recommendation to the President on whether to proceed with the development of Yucca Mountain as a federal repository.
• Site Recommendation Considerations Report: By December, DOE is to present the latest scientific information regarding Yucca Mountain to policymakers and the public to give adequate time for public input. This report will be essential to informing the public policy deliberations leading to the presidential site recommendation.
• Inter-Agency Collaboration: It is essential that DOE continue cooperative information sharing with the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). DOE will garner vitally important regulatory, scientific and technical input from these three groups. Frequent dialogue must be maintained throughout the course of this project.
• Public Hearings on DOE's Site Recommendation Considerations Report: Obtaining public input on this project is vitally important. Public hearings on the Site Recommendation Considerations Report must be scheduled and conducted in a timely manner to be completed by April 2001. It is DOE's responsibility to obtain public comments regarding Yucca Mountain so that they may be given full and complete consideration before the agency makes a formal site recommendation to the President.
• Environmental Impact Statement (EIS): DOE must address the voluminous public comments the agency received on its draft environmental impact statement, thoroughly review all input and issue a comprehensive, scientifically sound final EIS and record of decision on the Yucca Mountain project by July 2001.
• Site Recommendation: No later than July 2001, DOE must submit a scientifically sound recommendation from the Secretary of Energy to the President recommending whether to proceed with the repository project.

The scientific evidence to date strongly supports a decision to develop a repository at Yucca Mountain. However, if the agency's decision is to recommend against the site—it still is essential that the decision not be delayed. Should such a determination be the case, DOE must also inform Congress and recommend an alternative approach for the federal government to manage the disposal of civilian used nuclear fuel, as required by Section 113(c)(3)(f) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. We should not continue to spend billions of dollars on the Yucca Mountain project unless there is a reasonable expectation that it will be a safe, suitable site.

In the midst of this important phase of the Yucca Mountain project, DOE has chosen to "re-compete" the management and operations contract for the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management program, including the Yucca Mountain project. This decision by DOE should not be allowed to adversely affect the timely completion of DOE's work toward a site recommendation. Congress must provide continued oversight to ensure that DOE makes a transition in Yucca Mountain management and operation contractors in a manner that retains current milestones.

Ongoing congressional oversight is essential to prevent additional slippage in the schedule. The not-in-my-backyard opponents of the repository or those organizations seeking to eliminate nuclear energy welcome continued delay. It truly is ironic that some of the very same organizations expressing concern over greenhouse gases and global warming also are opposed to the one affordable, large-scale energy source that does not produce air pollutants—nuclear energy.

No matter how much scientific research has been completed, no matter how promising the results, it will always be possible to study and test more. Scientists are forever inquisitive, for every answer that their inquiries provide, new questions inevitably arise. That scientists will continue to raise new questions is not problematic. Congress planned for this when it designed the deliberative approval process for Yucca Mountain in 1982. The presidential decision on the site recommendation is not the final decision. It merely moves the process to the next step.

At Yucca Mountain, the congressionally mandated process requires four major steps:

• First, the president must make a decision, based on the recommendation of the Secretary of Energy, on whether to proceed with the repository at Yucca Mountain.
• If this recommendation is favorable, DOE would apply to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a construction permit for building the repository.
• Third, once construction is completed, DOE would request a license to operate a repository from the NRC. Repository operation is scheduled to begin in 2010.
• Fourth, in order for DOE to close the Yucca Mountain repository when the facility reaches its capacity and ongoing scientific testing is completed (projected to occur about 2050). DOE must obtain NRC authorization.

There will be ample opportunity for additional research and evaluation during each phase of repository construction and operation, and even after it closes. For example, before used nuclear fuel is permanently sealed in tunnels 1,000 feet under the surface of Yucca Mountain, it is possible that scientific advances could identify an improved technology for managing used nuclear fuel. DOE has discussed the possibility of extending the period before sealing the repository up to 300 years. However, this possibility should not be used as an excuse to delay the Yucca Mountain project.

After industry technical and scientific experts exhaustively reviewed the thousands of pages of documentation supporting DOE's Yucca Mountain viability assessment and draft environmental impact statement, and after many hours of discussion with DOE officials, the industry believes that there is sufficient data to justify moving to the next step in the process—a DOE site recommendation to the president in 2001. Congress should fully expect and ensure that a site recommendation is sent to the President by the 2001 deadline. This committee's leadership is needed to assure that this $6 billion repository project is completed in a timely and quality manner.

EPA's Proposed Radiation Standard Rejected by Scientists, Other Federal Agencies
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish public radiation protection standards for a used nuclear fuel disposal facility at Yucca Mountain. The law says the standard must protect health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain for at least 10,000 years. The law further requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to implement the standard by incorporating it into licensing requirements for a repository.

Establishing a radiation protection standard is an essential component of safely and responsibly managing used nuclear fuel. However, in developing the standard for Yucca Mountain, it is imperative that EPA adheres to specific instructions from the Congress and abides by the recommendations of credible scientific bodies. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Congress must ensure that EPA establishes scientifically sound radiation protection standards that protect public health and safety.

There is widespread disagreement between EPA and other federal agencies and between EPA and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), about the appropriate level for a Yucca Mountain radiation safety standard. In the 1992 Energy Policy Act, Congress required EPA to "prescribe the maximum annual effective dose equivalent to individual members of the public as the only such standard applicable to the Yucca Mountain site," thereby excluding from consideration a separate groundwater limit. Scientists typically refer to this method of standard setting as an "all-pathways" approach—meaning potential radiation exposure from all sources (air, groundwater, the food chain, etc.) are calculated to determine the total public health and safety risk to those citizens most likely to be affected. This law also mandated that EPA's Yucca Mountain radiation safety standard be based on and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the NAS. However, EPA ignored both Congress and the NAS, and proposed a highly controversial and scientifically unjustifiable separate groundwater limit taken from the Safe Drinking Water Act. This was in addition to the EPA's proposed 15 millirem overall standard. By using an all-pathways standard, the groundwater can be protected at Yucca Mountain.

The NAS published its recommendations — "Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" — in 1995. NAS recommended a health-based individual protection standard without separate groundwater limits. The country's leading scientists felt that placing constraints on a single factor—such as groundwater—would detract from an all-pathways approach, which the NAS believes best protects public health and safety. If the EPA adopts its proposed groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain, the agency would ignore the advice of America's scientific experts and violate the Energy Policy Act. In formal comments to EPA, the NAS said the agency's recommendation to establish a groundwater standard for Yucca Mountain is not based on sound science. The NAS added that EPA ignored its opinion that a separate groundwater standard was redundant given the protection provided by a 15 millirem all pathways standard. "EPA's groundwater proposal will add little, if any, additional protection to individuals or the general public from radiation releases from the repository," the NAS scientists said.

The NRC recommends an all-pathways standard of 25-millirem as fully protective of public health and safety and the environment, and also questioned the EPA's use of a groundwater limit.

Consistent with radiation protection standards at other disposal facilities, including at the Nevada Test Site, NEI supports a 25-millirem all-pathways radiation protection standard for Yucca Mountain. The industry strongly believes that EPA's proposed separate groundwater standard could result in less, not better, overall protection of public health and safety. By arbitrarily forcing the focus on a single factor, the design of the repository could actually allow more radioactivity to be released into the air in order to meet the groundwater limit.

The 25 millirem standard proposed by health and science professionals, other federal agencies and the industry is four times more protective than the state of Nevada's 100-millirem safety standard for industrial, research and medical users of nuclear materials in the state.

Conclusion
Industry's expectation that DOE should be held accountable for maintaining the schedule and scope of work at Yucca Mountain is based on a decade of unparalleled scientific scrutiny at the site. In fact, Yucca Mountain is one of the most studied pieces of property in the world. A deep geologic repository, located at an isolated, arid location, remains the cornerstone of the nation's used fuel management policy. There is no scientific basis for concluding that Yucca Mountain cannot fulfill the role of being a safe, environmentally responsible facility for commercial used nuclear fuel, and for the high-level radioactive waste from defense and other national programs that is stored in 40 states. The recent opening of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal of transuranic nuclear waste demonstrates that an underground disposal facility is feasible and can be developed in concert with protecting the environment.

Based on repeated promises from the federal government, electric utilities that built nuclear power plants expected used fuel to be stored for a short period of time at these plants, then shipped for disposal at a federal government facility.

Fuel storage facilities at nuclear power plants were never intended to provide long-term storage capacity. Because of Department of Energy delays in developing a federal repository, electricity consumers have been forced to pay twice for used nuclear fuel storage. Several hundred million dollars has been spent on developing additional on-site storage facilities at nuclear power plants since the late 1980s, and more are in the planning process. Meanwhile, electricity consumers continue to pay an additional $700 million every year into the Nuclear Waste Fund for DOE to manage used nuclear fuel. To date they have committed more than $16 billion for the program.

In some cases, building a temporary storage facility has subjected companies to unaccept-ably high political and financial costs. As difficult as they are today, these issues will only get more complex with further delay.

Establishing a radiation protection standard is an essential component of safely and responsibly managing used nuclear fuel. However, in developing the standard for Yucca Mountain, it is imperative that EPA adhere to specific instructions from the Congress and abide by the recommendations of credible scientific bodies, in establishing a radiation limit to protect public health and safety. The industry urges the EPA to adopt a 25-millirem all-pathways standard without a separate groundwater limit.

The facts before this subcommittee and this Congress are clear and simple: America's 103 nuclear power plants provide 20 percent of our electricity in a manner that produces no harmful air pollution. It is up to us, who enjoy the benefits of that electricity, to manage the byproducts of those facilities safely and responsibly. We simply cannot defer this problem to future generations. The time for promises has long passed—now is the time for action. Unparalleled scientific study at Yucca Mountain should be sufficient for DOE to make a site recommendation to the President in 2001. The industry fully expects them to do so without further delay. Congressional leadership is essential to hold DOE accountable for completing its critically important tasks and breaking the cycle of perpetual delay that has been the unfortunate history of this program.