Key Issues
Science Proves Potassium Iodide Unnecessary Beyond 10 Miles of a Nuclear Power Plant
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What It Takes to Be Prepared
Effective protection of the public in the event of a nuclear power plant accident rests on understanding basic technical details related to potential accidents and what measures will protect the public.
Nuclear plant emergency plans take into account every conceivable type of accident, as well as hostile actions such as terrorist activity. Sophisticated safety analysis conducted with state-of-the-art methods demonstrates that an accident involving the reactor at a U.S. nuclear power plant is likely to evolve over hours, if not days, allowing ample time to halt or mitigate the accident and to take protective actions for the public. In the event of a radioactive release from a nuclear power plant, the primary source of exposure to radioactivity within the 10-mile EPZ is from the plume—the section of air mass carrying the material—as it travels downwind.
Beyond the 10-mile EPZ, the primary mechanism for exposure to radioactivity—including radioactive iodine—is through consuming contaminated water, food or milk. To address this concern, the federal task force created the 50-mile EPZ. At that distance, direct exposure to radioactive materials would be slight because the material would have dispersed into extremely low concentrations in the air mass.
State and local government plans are in place to support implementation of protective actions in the 50-mile zone, should that be necessary. State and local government officials, the NRC and the nuclear power plants exercise these plans every six years.
Chernobyl: The Failure Of Emergency Response
Some advocates of stockpiling and distribution of KI at distances beyond the 10-mile EPZ cite the increase in thyroid cancers, especially among children, associated with the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl reactor. However, a 2004 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that the Chernobyl accident does not provide a strong basis for such an extended stockpiling and distribution of KI in the United States.3
3 “Distribution and Administration of Potassium Iodide in the Event of a Nuclear Incident,” The National Academy of Sciences, 2004.
What It Takes to Be Prepared
Effective protection of the public in the event of a nuclear power plant accident rests on understanding basic technical details related to potential accidents and what measures will protect the public.
Nuclear plant emergency plans take into account every conceivable type of accident, as well as hostile actions such as terrorist activity. Sophisticated safety analysis conducted with state-of-the-art methods demonstrates that an accident involving the reactor at a U.S. nuclear power plant is likely to evolve over hours, if not days, allowing ample time to halt or mitigate the accident and to take protective actions for the public. In the event of a radioactive release from a nuclear power plant, the primary source of exposure to radioactivity within the 10-mile EPZ is from the plume—the section of air mass carrying the material—as it travels downwind.
Beyond the 10-mile EPZ, the primary mechanism for exposure to radioactivity—including radioactive iodine—is through consuming contaminated water, food or milk. To address this concern, the federal task force created the 50-mile EPZ. At that distance, direct exposure to radioactive materials would be slight because the material would have dispersed into extremely low concentrations in the air mass.
State and local government plans are in place to support implementation of protective actions in the 50-mile zone, should that be necessary. State and local government officials, the NRC and the nuclear power plants exercise these plans every six years.
Chernobyl: The Failure Of Emergency Response
Some advocates of stockpiling and distribution of KI at distances beyond the 10-mile EPZ cite the increase in thyroid cancers, especially among children, associated with the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl reactor. However, a 2004 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) concluded that the Chernobyl accident does not provide a strong basis for such an extended stockpiling and distribution of KI in the United States.3
3 “Distribution and Administration of Potassium Iodide in the Event of a Nuclear Incident,” The National Academy of Sciences, 2004.
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