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Safer Nuclear Plant Designs
The risk of a U.S. reactor accident involving a large release of radioactive iodine is substantially less than for Chernobyl-type reactors. All U.S. power reactors have extensive safety features, including massive concrete-and-steel containment structures, to prevent large-scale radioactive releases.

Stringent Emergency Preparedness Plans
Even with the Chernobyl reactor’s poor design, officials could have averted many radioactive exposures to the population with effective emergency response.

• Alert and Notification. The Chernobyl accident was concealed from authorities and the local population. Officials did not begin even limited evacuations until about 36 hours after the accident. In the United States, nuclear power plants are required to alert local authorities and make recommendations for protecting the public within 15 minutes of identifying conditions that might lead to a significant release—even if such a release has not occurred. The NRC has resident inspectors posted at every nuclear power plant site to ensure that the plants are following federal safety requirements.
• Protecting the Food Chain. The food chain was not protected after the Chernobyl accident because details of the accident were not disclosed promptly. Unknowingly, many people continued to consume milk and food that was contaminated with radioactive iodine. People living in the region around Chernobyl tended to have relatively low levels of stable iodine in their thyroid glands, so they were highly susceptible to absorbing the radioactive element. Typical U.S. dietary intake of stable iodine is three to five times higher than it is in the area around Chernobyl. This difference would result in a much lower uptake of radioactive iodine in the thyroids of the population around U.S. reactors—even in the unlikely event of a release of radioactive iodine.
  

In summary, the NAS report concluded: “[If] contaminated milk and food had been avoided, most of the resulting thyroid cancers [around Chernobyl] would almost certainly not have occurred.” This is one of the principal objectives of the 50-mile EPZ around U.S. nuclear power plants. Because the food chain would be protected, KI would provide little additional value beyond the 10-mile EPZ. Within the 10-mile zone, sheltering and evacuation are the primary means for protecting the public—with consideration of KI use to provide an additional layer of protection.