Skip Bowman
President and Chief Executive Officer
Nuclear Energy Institute
“The Changing Climate for Nuclear Energy”
Nuclear Energy Assembly
Miami, Florida
May 24, 2007
Remarks as prepared for delivery
Good morning again.
Before I begin, let me thank John Rowe for the keen insights expressed in his “state of the industry” remarks. We are fortunate that John will serve as chairman of NEI’s Board of Directors. We will all benefit from the intellectual rigor and business discipline that John brings to all things, as we work together to guide the U.S. nuclear power industry through a time of great opportunity seasoned with some formidable challenges.
We all recognize that the need for nuclear energy is driven by our nation’s massive requirement for electricity, which cannot possibly be met by energy efficiency, demand-side management and renewables by themselves. To be sure, we must have greater efficiency, more demand-side management and more renewables, but we must also have high-tech coal and nuclear generating capacity to drive our $11 trillion-a-year economy. And over the last couple of years, we’re seeing increased attention to nuclear energy as part of the solution, driven by concerns about climate change.
So our theme for this year’s Nuclear Energy Assembly is “the changing climate for nuclear energy.” The theme has at least two dimensions.
First, the phrase “changing climate” obviously reflects the growing concern about the scientific phenomenon of climate change, global warming and growing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
And second, the changing climate for nuclear energy reflects the new policy climate in which we are operating—with growing numbers of our political leaders, policymakers and the public coming to recognize the strategic value of this energy source.
I want to spend my time this morning discussing both issues.
In the first dimension, I want to discuss climate change as a phenomenon, its implications and how we should position our industry.
And in the second dimension, I want to talk about how we must manage the changing political and policy environment. Yes, we see growing support for nuclear energy because it is a carbon-free technology, but it is not unqualified or unambiguous support. And there are steps we can take—must take—to shore up that support, to make it less ambiguous, more solid, more sustainable.
First, climate change.
Over the last 12 months, I participated in an exercise sponsored by the CNA Corporation, a non-profit organization that performs national security analysis. CNA organized a Military Advisory Board—a group of a dozen retired flag and general officers from all four services—to conduct a detailed, even-handed evaluation of the national security implications of climate change. You would recognize many of the names on the board:
- Gordon Sullivan, former Army Chief of Staff
- Tony Zinni, former Commander in Chief of Central Command
- Joe Prueher, former Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command and former Ambassador to China
- Dick Truly, former astronaut and NASA administrator, and others.
We received detailed briefings over many months from the U.S. intelligence community, climate scientists, business leaders and others.
As we developed our report—which was published in April and called “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change”—we came to recognize that we could not make a useful contribution to the ongoing debate over climate science.
But we did conclude that we could make a useful contribution to the ongoing policy debate by proposing a new way of thinking about climate change, and by focusing attention on the national security impacts of climate change, which could be staggering.
On the question of climate science—whether climate change has a significant manmade component … whether CO2 caused global temperature increases or vice versa—General Gordon Sullivan said it best: “We never have 100 percent certainty. If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield.”
We concluded that, even if catastrophic climate change is a low-probability event, the consequences are so staggering that America’s national security demands that we must take steps now to reduce the growth rate in CO2 emissions, and to prepare for (and adapt to) the potential extreme consequences of climate change.
The direct potential consequences have been well-documented: extreme weather events, drought, flooding, sea-level rise, increased spread of disease. Economic and environmental conditions in already fragile areas will further erode as food production declines. Water becomes increasingly scarce. Large populations move in search of essential resources.
The indirect potential consequences have not been so well-advertised. Climate change could seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian, African and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political instability and the likelihood of failed states.
Weakened and failing governments provide a breeding ground for internal conflict, genocide, extremism, radical ideologies, terrorism, dictatorships—all profound threats to our democratic principles and our market economy.
All this has potential negative implications for America’s national security. We will be drawn more and more frequently into situations, either alone or with our allies, to help provide stability before conditions worsen and are exploited by extremists. We will be called upon to undertake stability and reconstruction efforts once a conflict has begun. As former Marine Corps General Tony Zinni said: “We will pay for this one way or another. We can pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today, and we’ll have to take an economic hit of some kind. Or we will pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives. There will be a human toll.”
I don’t need to remind you that we can add energy security impacts to the national security and military impacts, because we’re dangerously dependent for energy on parts of the world most likely to experience political instability and social collapse, and whose values do not coincide with our own.
America depends on imported oil for 63 percent of its oil consumption—approximately 20 percent of that from the Persian Gulf.
We’re in the process of exacerbating that dependence on oil by increasing our dependence on imported natural gas. Consensus estimates show that the United States will be importing 25 percent to 30 percent of its natural gas needs within 20 years—from the Middle East, North Africa, the Atlantic Basin offshore East Africa—all regions seriously at risk.
These findings and the report’s recommendations have created a new driver for thoughtful approaches to the climate issue, at least in Washington, from an unusual angle—the national security aspects of climate change.
To repeat, our Military Advisory Board concluded that, even if global warming and extreme climate change are low-probability events, the consequences are so severe that they demand prudent, thoughtful steps to reduce CO2 emissions and prepare for potential impacts.
Well, this is familiar territory to the nuclear power industry. Our operating philosophy is predicated on planning for, and thereby avoiding, low-probability, potentially high-consequence events.
Discussion and debate over how to address climate change is dominating the policy agenda in Washington and across the country. The Nuclear Energy Institute has never taken a position on climate issues but we will, over the next several months, be working with the NEI Executive Committee and our member companies to define an appropriate policy position for the only carbon-free technology that’s available today and capable of large-scale expansion.
It may well be past time to abandon the notion that a voluntary, “best effort” approach, by itself, represents a viable policy. As the world’s largest economy and most powerful nation, the United States has a responsibility to provide leadership on critical issues with major geopolitical implications.
We are deluding ourselves if we believe we have taken even the first steps necessary to address our energy and environmental challenges. A recent analysis by the Government Accountability Office found that federal support for renewable, fossil and nuclear energy research and development declined by over 85 percent in real terms from 1978 through 2005.
And, as you just heard John Rowe say, the investment stimulus for new nuclear plant construction in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, as it is being implemented, may not be adequate to support financing and construction of even the first few new nuclear projects.
We know, from the work of Robert Socolow and Steven Pacala at Princeton University, and from ongoing analysis by our colleagues at the Electric Power Research Institute, that there is no single technology that can meet our country’s huge electricity demand while reducing growth in CO2 emissions.
Only aggressive deployment of a portfolio of technologies—energy efficiency, renewables, advanced coal with carbon capture and sequestration, nuclear energy—will reduce the upward trend in CO2 emissions.
Socolow and Pacala assume 700 gigawatts of nuclear capacity in place worldwide within 50 years, roughly a doubling of today’s capacity. EPRI’s analysis requires 64 gigawatts of new nuclear capacity in the United States by 2030, roughly a 60 percent increase from today.
Whether the numbers are right or reasonable hardly matters. They do provide a tangible sense of the enormity of our challenge, and they confirm one fact that is beyond dispute: increased production from nuclear energy is an unequivocal imperative.
Hardly a week passes without additional evidence that our national political leaders, our state government officials, our policymakers and policy institutions recognize this imperative. Republicans. Democrats. Union leaders. Wall Street. State legislators and state regulators.
So let’s turn to the other climate that’s changing—the political climate for nuclear power.
We have this from Sen. Barbara Boxer, chairman of the Senate Environment Committee: “The vast majority of the members on my committee support nuclear power, and so do the majority in the Senate. So my focus is on safety, security and research, because I don’t think there is any question that we are going to be seeing new plants.”
We have this from Judi Greenwald at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, one of the most articulate and level-headed advocates of mandatory actions to reduce CO2 emissions: “You can’t just write nuclear off. I think everybody feels you have to at least look again at nuclear power.”
Or this from the Progressive Policy Institute, the Democratic Leadership Council’s policy organization: “Nuclear power holds great potential to be an integral part of the diversified energy portfolio for America. It produces no greenhouse gases, so it can help clean up the air and combat climate change. And new plant designs promise to produce power more safely and economically.”
And this from the chief scientist at Environmental Defense: “Global warming is the environmental issue of our generation. Clearly, to solve this problem we need to have all technologies on the table. Therefore, nuclear energy needs to be considered.”
And there’s much more. State governments like Florida and Virginia and South Carolina passing legislation to encourage construction of new nuclear power plants by providing higher assurance of investment recovery. State regulatory commissions—Louisiana, for example—developing new rules to provide the investment certainty necessary to support construction of new nuclear plants.
We are re-launching the nuclear energy industry, and we have the wind at our backs. The climate has changed for nuclear energy.
Yes, we face challenges. But I would suggest that our biggest challenge sits here in this room today. We are the choir. We believe. But I would argue that we are also the challenge.
Why would I suggest such a thing? Think back to the quotes I just read to you.
Yes, we are seeing new support for nuclear energy, from organizations and individuals that have not supported us in the past. But that support is fragile and typically qualified.
Yes, they say, I agree with you about the benefits of nuclear power ... but what about safety?
Yes, I agree with you about the environmental benefits ... but what about used nuclear fuel?
Yes, I agree with you about price stability and the fact that nuclear plants have the lowest operating cost of any source of electricity ... but what about the cost of new nuclear plants?
Yes, I believe we must see major expansion of nuclear power worldwide … but what about proliferation?
These are genuine, legitimate questions. As you see, I call them the “Yes, but …” questions. They deserve serious, thoughtful responses. And we need to do better at answering those questions—much better.
If we fail to do so, the emerging support for nuclear power will remain qualified and uncertain.
Growing numbers of people want to believe that nuclear power should be a larger part of our nation’s energy portfolio. It’s up to us to give them reasons to believe. That’s one of our biggest challenges.
I’m not going to cover all of the “Yes, but …” questions today, partly because I don’t have time, partly because it’s not you I need to convince. But let me give examples of two cases that we in this room must be able to make: safety and used nuclear fuel.
What about safety?
This is our best-kept secret. All the safety-related metrics tracked by the industry and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission demonstrate high levels of excellence. Unplanned shutdowns are at near-record lows. Lost-time accident rates at record-low levels. Forced outage rates ... unplanned safety system actuations ... worker radiation exposures ... events with safety implications ... all down.
I have great confidence in nuclear plant safety based on those indicators. But I derive even more confidence from the process that produces those indicators, from the institutions we have created to share best practices ... to establish standards of excellence ... and to implement programs that hold us to those standards.
First, our industry has the strongest government regulator of any industrial sector: a regulator who routinely conducts over 2,000 hours of inspections a year through resident inspectors assigned 24-by-7 to each plant. With a regional office and headquarters staff to oversee the resident inspectors and assist with inspections when necessary. With the power to impose fines and order shutdown.
This independent oversight is backed up by our own unique form of self-regulation, born of a recognition that the nuclear industry is only as strong as its weakest link and cannot, therefore, tolerate weak links. How many people outside our small fraternity know that the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations performs a comprehensive evaluation of every U.S. nuclear plant every two years? Or that we maintain an industrywide database to catalog equipment problems and mean time between failures so that we can replace equipment before it fails, avoiding possible challenges to plant safety?
You know all that.
But what about those people who say, “Yes, I think nuclear energy is important … but what about safety?” Apparently, they haven’t heard. Apparently, we haven’t told them.
Shame on us. Are we the biggest challenge?
A second concern ... used fuel. How well do we answer the question “What are you going to do with the waste?” How well do we deal with the myths about used nuclear fuel?
The first myth: that the Department of Energy is simply going to bury the used nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain and walk away.
That’s not the plan, and it has never been the plan.
This facility will remain open and closely monitored for 100 to 300 years. The law requires an unspecified period of retrievability. NRC regulations require an ongoing confirmatory R&D program to verify the original assumptions based on new data and scientific development. This period of monitoring, retrievability and confirmatory R&D creates confidence that the repository is performing as designed ... that public safety is assured ... and that the environment is protected.
Myth No. 2: that there’s a lot of this stuff.
All the used fuel from all the nuclear plants that have ever operated in America would only cover one football field 7 yards deep.
This is a trivial amount of material. Our 103 operating plants produce 2,000 tons a year, compared to, say, 1.5 billion tons of CO2 a year from our coal-fired power plants.
Myth No. 3: that used fuel is difficult to manage.
Just the opposite: in engineering terms, used fuel is easy to manage and easy to monitor—certainly compared to the engineering challenges and sheer scale associated with capturing, compressing, transporting and sequestering the CO2 produced today by coal-fired power plants.
Don’t misunderstand me: at NEI, we know nuclear power cannot carry the load by itself, and we know the United States must continue to burn large amounts of coal. But let’s keep our nation’s environmental challenges in perspective.
Myth No. 4: that we don’t have a plan for used fuel.
Of course we have a plan. We will develop a network of long-term interim storage facilities, advanced fuel processing facilities and advanced reactors that will allow us to reduce the volume on that football field, reduce its toxicity and heat load, and reduce the time of long-term isolation required.
So we cannot allow nuclear energy to be demonized because of used fuel.
We need to stop apologizing for ourselves.
We were forced to put the defense on the field after the accident at Three Mile Island, and they’re still out there.
Enough. The defense needs a rest. Send in the offensive line, the running backs and wide receivers and playmakers.
We must develop thoughtful responses to all the “Yes, but …” questions. I have charged my senior management team with developing those responses—in various formats, from the simple 30-second sound bite to short fact sheets to more scholarly white papers—so that we have the materials necessary to address all potential audiences.
We must do better at engaging thoughtful people in factual discussion.
We must train and empower our people as ambassadors for nuclear energy.
Let’s escape for a moment from the tyranny of short-term thinking.
We’re approaching a new construction cycle for advanced light water reactors. These reactors are well-suited for baseload electricity production, and we will build many more of them well into the 21st century.
But a little further out—say, around 2025—we should be building high-temperature reactors, with a more varied product slate—electricity, of course, but also hydrogen and process heat.
We can envision high-temperature reactors co-located with oil refineries and coal gasification plants, providing the hydrogen they require to upgrade coal and the heavy crude oils of the future into usable products.
We can see high-temperature reactors generating process heat to produce clean drinking water, to extract oil from tar sands, and for scores of other industrial applications.
And beyond that, I believe we’ll see deployment of advanced technologies to recycle used fuel ... to recover the uranium and plutonium and the other fissile elements and recycle them into fresh fuel ... and to deploy new-design fast-spectrum reactors capable of burning the new fuels.
Nuclear energy has the smallest environmental footprint of any major source of energy available today or likely to be available in the next 100 years.
We have a bright and prosperous future. It’s ours for the taking.
But no one will drop that future in our laps. We must shape it. We must build it.
It’s up to us. Are we up to the challenge?