Good morning,
I thank the Nuclear Energy Institute for inviting me to speak today. I share the sentiments of the previous speakers that the events of March 11, 2011, have had a profound effect on the nuclear landscape and will continue to do so in the coming months.
Nuclear industry is living a difficult time!
On that day – March 11, 2011 – we were approaching the 25th anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, and press releases were drafted noting that 25 years had passed without our industry experiencing a significant core-damaging accident. In some of our minds we had, as an industry, learned our lessons from Chernobyl and TMI, and were looking forward to the bright renaissance in nuclear taking place around the globe. March 11 has changed that.
Of course, our first thoughts must go to the people of Japan most directly affected by the natural disasters on that date – the devastating earthquake and tsunamis; and also to the tens of thousands directly affected by the Fukushima-Daiichi accidents that followed.
The nuclear landscape after Fukushima is still developing, but some declarations have already been made.
In a few countries, plants will be shut down. Germany, for example, has announced the closure of seven older units. Other countries will likely slow the development of their nuclear programs. Italy and the UK fall in this group.
Others have announced their plans to continue forward with nuclear, but with additional safety controls, like stress tests in E.U., or similar tests in other countries. The U.S., China, France, India, and Russia fall in this group.
Some new entrants to nuclear will continue their plans unabated; Vietnam, Turkey, and Indonesia, for example. Others will pause and take a second look. So the debate will continue for months to come.
One thing that can be said with some certainty is that issues with the environment, with the demand for energy in developing countries, and with fuel supplies are all the same today as they were on March 10. Nuclear will remain a part of the energy mix for an expanding number of countries, which makes the role and the mission of WANO more important than ever.
As a result of the lessons from Fukushima, WANO will emerge stronger – an outcome that is absolutely essential to our industry’s future with a stronger oversight towards the Operators, while, in parallel, a reinforced role of the IAEA in harmonising the safety requirements.
Before addressing exactly how WANO must be stronger, it’s worth reflecting on our operating experience for just a moment. If one steps back and asks the question – What makes nuclear different, different from other forms of energy producing technologies? Three things come to mind.
The first is stored energy. Unlike a fossil plant, a year, 18 months, or even two years of fuel is stored in a relatively small metal cylinder. It demands great care and attention in managing that stored energy. Zack Pate, Chairman Emeritus of WANO, referred to this potential in his often quoted control room speech when he said that the operator at the reactor controls, when pulling control rods, has more power at his fingertips than a pilot of a 747 jumbo jet.
Over the years, we in WANO have put a great deal of emphasis on managing this stored energy well – we stress reactivity management, conservative decision-making, and a deliberate approach to plant operation. In fact, I would say that it is in this area that we have put most of our emphasis. And why? Perhaps it is because an event like Chernobyl is the result when this tremendous stored energy is mismanaged. WANO was formed in the wake of Chernobyl, so it is really no surprise that WANO’s programs and efforts emphasize this area.
The second thing that makes the nuclear technology unique is decay heat – it is a characteristic of nuclear power that after you shut down, the reactor continues to generate heat for hours, days, and months. Cooling must be maintained in one form or another. TMI and Fukushima demonstrate the results when decay heat is not removed. It’s not that WANO has ignored this area; we have not. A very recent SOER, for example, was issued on shutdown safety. However, if we take an objective look at everything WANO does, and recognize that two of the three major industry accidents have occurred in this area of decay heat management, one would have to conclude WANO is not doing enough.
The third and final area that makes nuclear unique is that the fission process creates radiation and radioactive waste as by-products. If we are to manage this technology well, we must manage these by-products well. If contamination is not controlled, and if personnel exposures are not managed, events in these areas will occur that will shake the foundation of trust in our industry.
People fear radiation – they cannot see it, taste it, or smell it. They must believe that the professionals who manage this nuclear industry are paying attention to it. In this area, I think the level of focus or emphasis by WANO is about right – not too much and not too little.
Some of you may be more accustomed to looking at the nuclear technology in terms of the three primary safety functions – control of reactivity, core cooling and containment. I contend that my discussion of the factors that make nuclear unique fits that model closely.
Controlling reactivity is another way of saying we must manage the stored energy; core cooling is the means by which you manage the decay heat; and containment is how we keep the nuclear reaction by-products from spreading. The two models are very similar.
So what does this analysis tell us? For one thing, two of the three most important core damaging events to occur in our industry, TMI and Fukushima, were the result of failing to remove properly the decay heat that was being generated.
For me, that means that if WANO must change to be stronger in the future, and I believe we must, then at least some of those changes must deal with our emphasis as an industry on how we ensure decay heat is removed under every possible scenario – through excellent operation and management of transients, through robust design, and through thorough emergency planning.
We plan to report to our members on the proposed WANO changes at our Biennial General Meeting in Schenzhen, China, in October.
One lesson we have already learned within WANO is the need for a good emergency plan that addresses what WANO will do and how we communicate when events such as this occur. We had none, and one is being developed now.
However, our London office and Regional Centres took a number of actions in the first hours and days following the accident:
- We communicated daily with our Tokyo Centre and we started issuing daily updates to all member chief executives. In fact, our first communication went out on the same day as the event, March 11.
- We sent people from London, Paris, and Atlanta to strengthen the Tokyo Centre staff.
- We surveyed our members to determine what expertise and equipment or supplies they could provide on short notice to help TEPCO. We provided this information to our Tokyo Centre.
- Within 6 days of the accident, with a great deal of help from INPO, we issued a Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) asking our members to take four specific actions to verify their ability to deal with a station blackout or beyond design basis event. We plan to update that SOER or issue new ones as more lessons emerge. For example, we will shortly release a second document containing recommendations for fuel pools.
- We issued press releases and held numerous interviews with the press.
In the intermediate to long term, it is clear WANO must change as I have already mentioned. The WANO Governing Board has set up an internal commission to prepare the full scope of changes to be made, but some are readily apparent today. We will move forward with these now, and if we need to make a course correction later, we will do so. I think you will see in the actions that follow a greater emphasis by WANO on that aspect of the nuclear technology I referred to earlier – namely, managing decay heat. Some of the actions that are already clear are the following:
Better define the roles and responsibilities for WANO in an emergency. This will include the actions that the Regional Centre where the event is occurring should take, the actions by the other Regional Centres, and the London office responsibilities.
Add emergency preparedness as a core review area to each and every WANO peer review. In fact we will go beyond the traditional emergency preparedness area and look at an organization’s ability to mitigate a beyond design basis event.
Look more closely at fuel storage – including fuel pools and dry cask storage; how are cooling and electrical supplies designed; what sort of redundancy; it may be necessary to develop international standards of excellence in this area and conduct reviews at every member utility.
I think it is fair to say we will need to look at some aspects of design. This is perhaps the most challenging area. It is not practical for WANO to do a complete design review. We don’t have the expertise or time to do so. Perhaps we will focus on those design issues related to the ability to remove decay heat for extended time periods following a station blackout. This area needs more thought and discussion and is a focus area for our internal commission.
Finally, there are few other issues that have surfaced as a result of this event but arguably are not directly related to TEPCO or the Fukushima disaster. We are addressing these also. One such issue is the WANO communications strategy. Shortly after the event, we communicated with the IAEA and suggested our two organisations work together as the lessons from Japan are developed – the IAEA gathering the national regulators from around the world and WANO representing the world’s operators.
The broader question, of course, is the degree of cooperation that is appropriate on an ongoing basis between WANO and the IAEA, and other organisations like WNA, WEC (World Energy Council), JANTI, and INPO. The answer is obvious for some of these organisations. We must have close cooperation with INPO, JANTI, and WNA, and similar organizations, but it is good to look at this question on a holistic basis.
One final thought – in my opinion we face two risks as we move forward from this accident.
The first, and well known to all of you, is the loss of trust by people in countries served by nuclear power, and, for that matter, loss of trust by those dedicated employees who work within the nuclear industry. It varies by country and by region, but many are asking today if a similar accident could occur somewhere near them.
The second is over-confidence. It may seem strange to say this so soon following such a major accident, but I believe it is a risk. I have heard industry executives state that such an accident could never happen at their plants. Those words are dangerous, and I believe do not serve to build trust – in fact, just the opposite.
Let me close by summarising the following key points:
The lessons from the Fukushima event are only beginning to be known, but it is clear that the nuclear landscape will be different and that WANO must change.
Our industry is best served by a credible regulator and a strong WANO, both supporting the industry in a complementary fashion.
We must guard against complacency if we are to build back trust in the nuclear technology.
In addition with Emergency preparedness, several of the changes being considered for WANO fall in the area of managing decay heat, the fundamental issue for two of the three major industry accidents that have occurred.
WANO must have the trust of its members. That means working efficiently, safeguarding the confidentiality of member information, and consistently holding members accountable to their shared obligations - including transparency among the members - to the nuclear community.
In a word, WANO will emerge from the Fukushima accident stronger and more effective.
Thank you.