- Crown Prince Salman Meets with Trump at White House
- Rep. Ros-Lehtinen introduces legislation on Section 123 agreements
- Experts call for U.S. to seize opportunity of engagement with Saudis
As Saudi Arabia considers building up to 17.6 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2032, the country’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman visited the United States this week and met with President Donald Trump at the White House. Nearby on Capitol Hill, a U.S. House of Representatives subcommittee held a hearing on nuclear cooperation between the two countries.
“Saudi Arabia will construct civilian nuclear reactors. The only remaining question is: who will build them?” Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) said. “I believe the commercial interests and the national security interests are intertwined, with the suppliers of this technology gaining decades of influence over regional energy, security and nonproliferation standards.”
Legislation
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.), chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa which held the hearing, recently introduced legislation (HR 5357) to amend the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) that would, in effect, require up or down votes in the House and Senate on peaceful nuclear cooperation (Section 123) agreements with foreign countries. This change would upset the legislative and executive branch balance of review intended by the congressional authors of the AEA.
Nearly identical to the earlier HR 1280 in the 112th Congress, HR 5357 seeks to create additional hurdles to peaceful nuclear cooperation. Numerous world-renowned experts including John Hamre, former deputy secretary of defense, have noted that this restrictive, one-size-fits-all approach would reduce U.S. influence on nuclear programs abroad.
“This legislation was a bad idea in 2011; with the increased competition for nuclear cooperation from Russia and China, it is an even a worse idea today,” said NEI Vice President of Suppliers, New Reactors and International Programs Dan Lipman.
The industry supports efforts to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies consistent with longstanding U.S. policy. A unilateral and inflexible requirement that countries forswear their rights to enrichment and reprocessing in 123 agreements would have the perverse effect of undermining U.S. nonproliferation interests according to Lipman.
“The net effect of refusing to conclude 123 agreements with countries that are unwilling to enter into a treaty which renounces enrichment and reprocessing would be to guarantee that they do business with other countries, thereby foregoing the economic and national security benefits of commercial nuclear engagement,” Lipman said.
Long-term U.S. influence on global nonproliferation policy and nuclear safety practices, and continued U.S. technology leadership, require a strong U.S. presence in global commercial nuclear markets.
Nuclear Experts See Value in U.S. Cooperation With Saudi Arabia
Experts in nuclear trade and nonproliferation also weighed in this week with their thoughts on why and how the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can engage in commercial nuclear trade in ways that benefit both countries and the world.
Partnership for Global Security President Kenneth Luongo said that the U.S. could offer “unsurpassed” human capital and training opportunities, if Saudi Arabia decides to build a commercial nuclear power sector.
“The U.S. represents the highest global standard in nuclear regulation and it has a long and strong record of opposing nuclear proliferation and strengthening global nuclear safety and security,” Luongo said. “Further, the U.S. offers unsurpassed educational and national laboratory infrastructure for the education and training of personnel. It is vital to understand that the global security value the U.S. provides as an important alternative to other nuclear suppliers that do not exhibit the same deep commitment to strong non-proliferation and nuclear security standards.”
Policy analyst for energy and environmental issues at the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation Katie Tubb warned against fixating on a nuclear trade agreement with Saudi Arabia that would ban reprocessing and enriching nuclear fuel which is sometimes referred to as the “gold standard.”
“In fixating on this misleadingly-named ‘gold standard,’ advocates are missing the major gains that could be made by engaging with Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program through a 123 agreement,” Tubb said. “The U.S. has a unique opportunity to engage with Saudi Arabia and help guide its peaceful introduction of commercial nuclear power, to which a 123 agreement is the doorway.”