- Many advanced reactor designs require more enriched nuclear fuels
- Current U.S. fuel cycle infrastructure not capable of meeting demand
- Either develop U.S. uranium enrichment capacity or depend on foreign suppliers
The Nuclear Energy Institute is warning that preparations should begin now to develop a national fuel cycle infrastructure to support the operation of advanced reactors that are expected to begin deployment in the 2020s and 2030s.
If the United States and its allies have to depend on foreign, state-owned enterprises to meet fuel needs, it will be in a much weaker position to influence these policies globally.
Interest in the development of advanced nuclear reactor designs has been increasing in recent years. Many of these designs will require uranium fuel that is enriched to a higher degree in the fissile isotope U-235 than in the current worldwide fleet of light water reactors (LWRs). Fuel for advanced reactors, enriched in U-235 to between 5 percent and 20 percent, is called high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU).
Some of the advanced-performance fuels currently being developed for use with the existing reactor fleet also will require HALEU. However, there are no U.S.-based facilities that manufacture HALEU on a commercial scale. While small quantities of HALEU materials may be obtained on an interim basis by “blending down” existing government stocks of surplus high-enriched uranium (HEU), those HEU materials are limited in supply and not readily available.
Thus, for the long-term operation of advanced reactors, as well as for advanced fuels in existing reactors, a robust new infrastructure for HALEU fuel manufacture is needed.
An NEI white paper published last month describes the challenges with establishing an infrastructure to support the fuel needs of future advanced reactors and recommends solutions.
The paper says establishing such a capability will better position the U.S. to advance nuclear safety and nonproliferation policies around the world, while helping to ensure a robust commercial industry domestically in the decades ahead.
On the other hand, “if the United States and its allies have to depend on foreign, state-owned enterprises to meet fuel needs, it will be in a much weaker position to influence these policies globally.”
The U.S. nuclear industry will require the technical involvement and financial support of the U.S. government to develop HALEU capability in a timely manner, the paper says.
In order to design, license and construct the necessary HALEU enrichment and fuel fabrication facilities, the U.S. Department of Energy may need to develop additional benchmark data on the criticality safety of uranium materials and fuels enriched to HALEU levels. The criticality benchmark data also would be used to license new shipping packages certified for the safe transport of HALEU materials and fuel. Certification of new shipping packages will involve the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. Department of Transportation.
NRC support also will be needed to develop guidance for material control and accountability of HALEU material under the “Category II” special nuclear material (SNM) designation and to develop guidance for implementing a physical security plan for Category II SNM.
“Given that some of these activities can and should be conducted in parallel, the industry and the government should work in an integrated manner to establish within the next decade the infrastructure to produce HALEU material and fabricate HALEU fuel for the next generation of advanced reactors and for advanced LWR fuel for the current fleet,” NEI Senior Director for New Plant, SMRs and Advanced Reactors Michael Tschiltz said.